



האוניברסיטה
העברית
בירושלים
THE HEBREW
UNIVERSITY
OF JERUSALEM

The Value of Additional Airport Slots

Nicole Adler & Ekaterina Yazhemsky
Hebrew University

Outline

- Regulated vs. Unregulated capacity
 - Europe versus United States
 - Consequences: costs and delays
- Measuring the effect of capacity constraints
 - Marginal productivity estimation
 - Structural equation modeling
- Case study: EU & US
 - Value of additional slot at peak in Europe
 - Value of reduction in slot at peak in US
 - Overall social welfare comparison considering airports, airlines & passengers



Consequences of Unregulated Capacity

- 1986: 1,144 flights per day experienced delays \geq than 15 min
- 2007: nearly $\frac{1}{4}$ US airline flights \geq 15 min late
 - $\frac{1}{3}$ result of inability of aviation system to handle growth in demand

Table 2-4: Overall cost of US air transportation delays for 2007 (\$ billions)

Cost Component	Cost
Cost to Airlines	8.3
Costs to Passengers	16.7
Cost from Lost Demand	3.9
Total Direct Cost	28.9
Impact on GDP	4.0



Regulated capacity: Europe

Airport	Feasible Capacity
Amsterdam Schiphol	Movement capacity: 510,000 movements/year Technical capacity: 615,000 movements/year
Dusseldorf	Movement capacity: 45 movements/hour Technical capacity: 56 movements/hour
London Heathrow	Current capacity: 41 arrivals/hour, 43 departures/hour Annual capacity: 480,000 movements/year
Madrid Barajas	Current capacity: 98 movements/hour Technical capacity: 120 movements/hour
Milan Linate	Current capacity: 18 movements/hour far below technical capacity of airport
Paris Orly	Legal limit: 250,000 slots/year far below technical capacity of airport

Source: European Commission, Impact assessment of revisions to Regulation 95/93, Final report (sections 1-12), March 2011




Regulated capacity: Europe (European

Commission, Impact assessment of revisions to Regulation 95/93, Final report (sections 1-12), March 2011)

FIGURE 3.8 LONDON HEATHROW SLOT REQUESTS AND ALLOCATION

S10
Arrivals:



S10
Departures :





FIGURE 3.9 MADRID SLOT REQUESTS AND ALLOCATION

S10
Arrivals:



S10
Departures :




TABLE I. COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE TWO AIRPORTS IN 2007

	FRA	EWR
No. of passengers ^a	54.2 million	36.4 million
No. of movements	479,874	443,952
Passengers per movement	113	82
No. of runways	3	3
Cargo volume (tons)	2.2 million	0.9 million
International passengers	85%	29%
Dominant carrier	Lufthansa	Continental




Figure 6. FRA: schedule (left scale) and delays (right scale)




Figure 7. EWR: schedule (left scale) and delays (right scale)

Comparing the US versus European Approach

Source: Odoni & Morisset (2011)

Intermediate Conclusions


- Inferences
 - Need to balance capacity utilization (highest in US) with delays (lowest in Europe)
 - Slot allocation system needs to be rebalanced at peak
 - In Europe, slots could potentially be increased
 - In US, slots could be introduced or decreased
- Aim
 - Evaluate marginal benefit of additional slot
- How?
 - Structural equation modeling
 - Second stage welfare comparison




Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)

- SEM allows simultaneous modeling of relationships between multiple independent and dependent variables
- SEM distinguishes between
 - exogenous (independent) and endogenous (dependent) *latent* variables
 - highly-correlated indicators (causal measures)
- Using PLS:
 - assuming linear relationships
 - non-parametric analysis





Marginal impact on consumer surplus from increasing slots



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Airports: 30 busiest in US and Europe

Europe	North America
Amsterdam (AMS)	Atlanta (ATL)
Barcelona (BCN)	Charlotte (CLT)
Copenhagen (CPH)	Chicago O'Hare (ORD)
Dusseldorf (DUS)	Denver (DEN)
Frankfurt (FRA)	Houston (IAH)
London Gatwick (LGW)	LaGuardia (LGA)
London Heathrow (LHR)	Las Vegas (LAS)
Madrid Barajas (MAD)	Los Angeles (LAX)
Milan Linate (LIN)	New York (JFK)
Munich (MUC)	Newark (EWR)
Palma de-Mallorca (PMI)	Philadelphia (PHL)
Paris (CDG)	Phoenix (PHX)
Rome Fiumicino (FCO)	Washington (DCA)
Vienna (VIE)	
Zurich (ZRH)	
Brussels (BRU)	
Tel-Aviv (TLV)	

Variables: 2002-2013

- **Operational:-**
 - Runway Capacity: VFR / IFR
 - Terminal Capacity
 - Air traffic movements: February & August
 - Passengers: February & August
- **Delay:-**
 - Average delay per movement: arrival /departure/total in February & August
- **Economic:-**
 - Revenues: commercial and aeronautical
 - Passenger facility charges (US)
 - Costs: staff, other operating, fixed




US vs Europe: averaged 2002-13


	Airside Capacity		Gates	Air Traffic Movements		Passengers		Average Delays (minutes)		EBITDA (PFC)
	VFR	IFR		Feb	Aug	Feb	Aug	Feb	Aug	
US	141	110	117	41,725	48,890	3,168,868	4,126,340	27	27	1,345,429
Europe		75	112	22,765	28,146	2,146,103	3,314,899	24	22	261,628,487




Results: Europe in Peak




Europe Peak Season




Europe Off Season



Europe Peak Season



US Peak Season



Path Total Effects

	Europe			United States		
	Std. coefficient	t- statistic	Nominal coefficient	Std. coefficient	t- statistic	Nominal coefficient
	August					
Airside capacity -> Delays	0.59	10.11	8,109	0.53	8.14	7,445
Airside capacity -> PAX	0.70	20.44	47,300	0.57	9.31	22,011
ATM -> Profitability	0.67	11.71	13,296	0.47	3.75	2,114
Airside capacity -> Profitability	0.60	14.14	4,731,791	0.27	2.42	450,785
Terminal capacity -> Profitability	0.09	2.67	328,922	0.30	3.19	615,980



Social Welfare Analysis Annually (2013 \$)

from addition/reduction of 10 peak flights/day

	Europe (additional 10 flights/day)			US (reduction 10 flights/day)		
	Expected	Lower (Narrow-body)	Upper (Wide-body)	Expected	Lower (Regional)	Upper (Wide-body)
Airports:						
Profit/Loss	54,367,012	↑		-10,371,621	↓	
Airlines:						
Profit/Loss	929,714	↓	312,110 4,705,253	-854,361	↑	-279,550 -8,620,700
Delay	-14,807,451	↓		21,903,873	↑	
Passengers:						
Willingness to Pay	38,233,307	↑		-38,806,079	↓	
Delay	-11,124,931	↑		10,089,832	↓	
	67,597,651			-18,038,356		



Conclusions

- Airside greater impact on throughput than landside
- Slot allocations limit throughput hence reduce delays
 - In Europe **worthwhile** increasing slots because:
 - value of marginal slot exceeds additional cost of delay
 - **worthwhile for airports & passengers**, *not for airlines*
 - In US: savings in delays from reduction of flight in peak hour **insufficient** to justify slot limitations
 - **worthwhile for airlines** *not for airports or passengers*
- Results dependent on value of time for passengers
 - If tripled, US marginal slot reduction worthwhile

