This document was submitted for discussion under item 5 “Transport Security and Terrorism” of the Agenda of the Bucharest session of the Council of Ministers.

It also includes a Ministerial Declaration on Combating Terrorism in Transport, which was approved by the Council of Ministers.
1. CONTEXT

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 in New York and Washington modified probably forever the way security is approached in the transport sector. The use of transport vehicles as actual weapons of destruction targeting both passengers in the vehicles and individuals located in the target buildings exposed a whole new degree of vulnerability within the transport system. As a result of the previously inconceivable magnitude of physical destruction and loss of life, transport authorities and service providers on all levels and in all sectors are having to adjust traditional security assessment procedures and tools to manage and effectively respond to this new level of risk.1

Well before these terrorist strikes on the United States, transport infrastructure and equipment has been the target of terrorist action for a number of reasons, among them, it is:

- relatively accessible;
- can attract significant public attention and media coverage;
- is often linked with national symbols such as national airlines;
- can affect large numbers of people in a single strike.

Transport sector experience since the events of late 2001 has revealed a number of areas of uncertainty with regard to ensuring security against terrorism attacks in transport. Transport authorities and operators have since September 11 found themselves seeking answers to a number of security-related questions, among them:

- Are existing security measures and procedures sufficient in the current post-September 11 context? Where are the remaining vulnerabilities in the system and how best can they be addressed? Is it just a question of better implementation/greater enforcement of existing procedures or are new measures needed?

- Are the current evaluation tools, including risk and vulnerability assessment methodologies, sufficient to provide the necessary information to decision-makers given the magnitude and potential impact of the terrorist threat, particularly with perceptions of heightened insecurity in certain areas since the attacks? What are the costs of using these tools, and who should cover these costs? What are acceptable levels of risk?

- Similarly, how much security is « enough »? That is to say, where is it necessary to draw the line in tightening security so as to avoid unnecessarily increasing transport costs without adding benefits, and thereby constraining transport activity which is essential to national economic health?

In seeking to come to grips with these and other questions, transport entities have been meeting on local, regional and national levels of government and within some sectors on a multilateral basis to take stock of security considerations relative to counter-terrorism, share best practice, and evaluate necessary technical, legal and legislative adjustments to ensure maximum protection based on evaluated risk against terrorist activity in transport.

Experience in the transport sector since the 11 September attacks also reveals that most activities to enhance security since that time have been concentrated within individual transport modes.2

terrorism in the aviation and maritime sectors -- though actively debated at present in multilateral organisations -- remains focused on those individual modes. Rail security appears to be largely focused on national-level initiatives, with little inter-governmental exchange to date. Terrorism in road transport has received relatively little attention. There appears to be no multilateral discussion underway on potential risks concerning inland waterway terrorism. And whilst there does appear to be significant experience in establishing an intermodal, public transit system-wide approach to counter-terrorist policies and measures, the debate remains logically focused on a local and national level.

2. CO-ORDINATION ON SECURITY AMONG MODES AND SECTORS

If this mode-focused approach to counter-terrorism measures is indeed the case in most countries, then it would seem that there may be further need to ensure that the linkages among air and rail, rail and road, inland waterway and maritime transport are seen in the context of an intermodal transport security framework. Several factors stand out as particularly important. Whilst some counter-terrorism measures are clearly mode-specific -- e.g., barring cockpit access in planes, mandatory installation of automatic identification systems for ships, etc. -- others have implications for several modes, e.g., transparency in tracking of container goods in transit via road, rail or waterways to airports and maritime ports. The involvement of several modes in the latter example demonstrates, it would seem, the need for a co-ordinated security approach: lack of vigilance at any point in the transport chain could render the entire chain vulnerable to terrorist action.

Moreover, security measures imply costs, and fragmented, mode-specific security measures may lead to inefficiencies in resource allocation across the sector. A co-ordinated and level playing field as concerns costs is important notably for industry: piecemeal security requirements in individual sectors that do not take account of initiatives in related modes can result in inconsistent demands being made on transport service providers, operators, etc. Co-operation with the private sector may be especially important in this regard.

Co-ordination on transport security and terrorism – be it among modes, private and public sector entities, or countries – necessitates some degree of policy transparency. Whilst caution is running high at present with regard to the sensitivity of information related to terrorism in the transport sector – and understandably so -- it may nevertheless be important that national counter-terrorism experience for modes other than aviation and maritime -- which already benefit from multilateral co-ordination -- be shared to the extent deemed possible by national authorities with other countries in a multilateral setting. In this way, best practice is shared (e.g. information exchange on new security technologies), vulnerabilities within the system are better understood (and thereby can be more effectively addressed) and co-ordination among countries is enhanced. If determined by its members to be of potential use, ECMT could serve as a forum in which this enhanced, intermodal discussion on terrorism and security in the transport sector could be pursued.

3. ROLE OF TRANSPORT MINISTRIES AND MINISTERS

Transport Ministers usually find themselves in the spotlight after violent attacks on transport infrastructure and equipment, obligated to rapidly reassure a worried public that emergency security measures are being taken to ensure safe transport. And co-ordination of transport-sector security initiatives falls on their shoulders in times of terrorist or other violent activity. The necessity for Ministries to identify and address vulnerabilities within and across transport modes has becomeparticularly apparent since the events of September 2001.
Based on the information obtained to date, there appears to be a number of areas in which Transport Ministries can effectively oversee the policy and technical debate surrounding counter-terrorism in transport.

Transport Ministries and Ministers can:

- Ensure a co-ordinated inter-modal framework for security in the transport sector, in coordination with other Ministries handling national security and terrorist issues (e.g., the Ministries of Defence and Interior);
- Provide support for risk and vulnerability assessments as well as training for personnel on emergency procedures within and between modes as well as on regional and local levels;
- Share to the extent possible experience and best practice on transport security and counter-terrorism measures with other governments;
  • whilst a multilateral framework exists for aviation and maritime, it is lacking for surface modes.
- Build on already existing initiatives to improve security and reduce crime in transport (e.g., tracking of goods transport) where possible to improve transport efficiency and counter-terrorism measures; and
- Similarly, seek measures that create complementarity among security, safety and counter-terrorism initiatives.
MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON COMBATING TERRORISM IN TRANSPORT

We the Ministers of Transport of the Member and Associate Member Countries of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, having met in Council on 29-30 May in Bucharest, Romania:


CONSCIOUS that the nature of these attacks – the magnitude of physical destruction and loss of life, as well as the use of transport vehicles as means to perpetrate these acts of violence – has changed the context in which transport security policy is developed and implemented across modes;

EXPRESSING our determination to work at national and international levels to ensure that transport is able to exercise its vital role in society and the economy, unhindered by the threat of terrorist action.

NOTING the work in several fora to address terrorism and transport, including:

− the Transport Ministers’ Statement on Counter-Terrorism in maritime and aviation transport of 15 January 2002 in Tokyo;

− the Declaration endorsing the establishment of a comprehensive Aviation Security Plan of Action at the ICAO Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security issued at the Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security in Montreal, 19-20 February 2002;

− work within international bodies such as ECAC, IMO, the G8, UNECE, the EC and OECD to review and strengthen counter-terrorism initiatives within the transport sector; and efforts of international industry entities such as the UIC and IRU to enhance understanding of industry’s concerns relative to transport terrorism and effective measures to improve security.

AWARE that:

− most activities to enhance security since 11 September 2001 have been planned and implemented within individual modes, necessitating a more global approach to security covering all links in the transport chain;

− whilst in place for aviation and maritime, a multilateral framework for discussion on terrorism in transport is necessary for surface modes.

CONSIDERING the need to find an appropriate balance between:

− improving security and ensuring the smooth flow of goods and people nationally and internationally;

− the need for transparency in an exchange of ideas and best practice with other countries and the importance of confidentiality in order to ensure the efficacy of measures.
AGREE to:

− Continue to work on implementing Resolutions 1986/58 on Aviation Security as well as 1997/2 and 1999/3 on crime in transport;

− Promote a co-ordinated intermodal approach to security in the transport sector in our countries in co-ordination with other relevant bodies in our governments;

− Share to the extent possible our experience and best practice on transport security and counter-terrorism with other governments in order to further understanding and co-operation in this area;

− Provide support as needed for risk and vulnerability assessments as well as training for personnel on emergency procedures within and between modes and on regional and local levels;

− Seek measures that create complementarity among security, safety and counter-terrorism initiatives.

REQUEST ECMT to:

− Develop its work on security and terrorism;

− Monitor developments in improving transport security and share experience on good practice across the transport sector among Member and Associate Members;

− Work with OECD, ECAC, and IMO to bring issues and experiences from the aviation and shipping sectors to Ministers’ attention and to ensure, as far as practicable, a consistent approach across different modes;

− Seek ways to combine efficiency and security improvements in the transport system with measures combating terrorism, for example by examining effective ways of tracking goods along the transport chain to prevent inconsistent and incompatible security requirements among modes.

REQUEST UN/ECE to:

− Conduct a review of their legal instruments to verify that they adequately take into consideration implications for transport security since the attacks of 11 September 2001.