Toward Risk-Based Aviation Security

by

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Overview of presentation

- Macro-level anti-terrorism considerations
- Using relative cost-effectiveness: an example
- Comparative aviation security: Canada, Europe, and the United States
- An approach to more risk-based aviation security
- Conclusions
Some macro-level considerations

- Inherent asymmetries give the advantage to terrorists (e.g., target-rich vs. target-poor environments).
- Benefit/cost analysis is far more difficult for anti-terrorism than for other issues (Copenhagen Consensus paper).
- Terrorists adapt and counter defensive technologies (RAND).
- Hence, defenses need to be flexible and dynamic, not static.
Relative cost-effectiveness is a promising approach.

- Analogy with safety regulatory analysis: estimate annual cost per life saved.
- U.S. DOT uses $3 million per life saved as benchmark.
- Stewart & Mueller analyze in-flight and pre-board TSA security measures.
- Plausible assumptions show that air marshals are 225X as costly as cockpit doors; sensitivity analysis confirms general result.
- Similar calculation finds pre-flight screening 35X as costly as cockpit doors.
Comparative approaches: Canada, Europe, and USA

- Hijackings were the initial threat in all three cases.
- ICAO Annex 17 provides the basic framework for all member states.
- Regimes amended as threat evolved to include in-flight bombings and suicide terrorism.
- 9/11 led to CATSA in Canada, TSA in US.
- EU-wide policy since 2002; amended 2008.
Who pays for aviation security?

- **Canada**: 100% covered by tax on airline tickets (mode-specific).
- **Europe**: varies by country but mostly airline, airport, and passenger charges (largely mode-specific).
- **USA**: about 50% of TSA aviation costs covered by aviation taxes; balance from general fund. Other costs in airport budgets, paid by airlines. (Mix of modal and “defense” approach).
Who provides aviation security?

- **Canada**: crown corporation (CATSA), regulated by Transport Canada.
- **Europe**: mostly airports, regulated by transport ministry.
- **USA**: TSA and airports (regulated by TSA).
- **Canada and Europe**: outsource airport screening; USA does not (hence, less flexible).
How risk-based are aviation security policies?

- ICAO Annex 17 calls for threat-based, risk-assessed security policies—but spells out numerous “input” requirements.
- CATSA Advisory Panel and Auditor General called for risk-based policies.
- EU’s 2008 policy calls for tailoring policies based on relative risk.
- TSA and parent agency DHS use risk-assessment rhetoric.
Risk-based policies in practice: cargo, not passengers

- Generally, “known shipper” policies, random screening, and intelligence-based screening have prevailed in air cargo (similar to maritime and surface transport).
- But the most prominent risk-based passenger policy—Registered Traveler—has not been implemented anywhere.
- What TSA allows as RT is not risk-based at all.
Outline of a risk-based approach

- Change emphasis from detecting dangerous objects to detecting dangerous people.
- Allocate screening resources (passenger and baggage) based on relative risk.
- Use savings to increase security within terminal, on the ramp, and at airport perimeter.
- Subject all components to cost/life saved analysis.
Three-tier approach to passengers

- Low-risk: security clearance or pass criminal-history background check (Registered Travelers).
- High-risk: either those identified as risks by intelligence information or about whom very little information exists.
- Ordinary passengers: everyone else.
Risk-based passenger screening

- Registered Travelers: pre-9/11 screening in fast lanes (no shoe or jacket removal or laptop, etc. removal).
- Ordinary travelers: current screening process.
- High-risk travelers: mandatory “secondary screening” for those on watch list (body scan and explosives screening of carry-ons); detention for those on no-fly list.
Risk-based checked-baggage screening

- Registered Travelers: 2-D X-ray of bags, plus random use of EDS.
- Ordinary travelers: tiered system, 2-D X-ray followed by EDS if indicated.
- Watch-list travelers: mandatory EDS.
Conclusions (1)

- Target-hardening is inherently problematical, given terrorist flexibility. But since aviation is a high-profile target, we have to do something.

- Relative cost-effectiveness (annual cost per life saved) is a workable approach to choosing among aviation security tools.
Conclusions (2)

- A risk-based approach to selecting security measures would shift resources to more cost-effective tools.
- Risk-based measures should be flexible, changing in response to new information.
- The biggest obstacle to a risk-based approach is elected officials’ preference for dramatic, visible (and static) measures.
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