Environmental labelling of vessels and emission reporting
Environmental labelling schemes aim to encourage a change in supplier and consumer behaviour using market signals without resorting to explicit controls and regulation regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other environmental concerns (Hermann et al., 2015). The schemes assign a rating or label to shipping companies or vessels and are meant to highlight 'greener' options for transporting goods. These labels can turn environmental performance into a competitive advantage. Companies may be incentivised to participate if they are included in databases of 'green' shipping companies, incur lower port fees where schemes are recognised, and gain discounts on some maritime services.
Existing schemes are privately managed and evaluate performance with respect to varying criteria such as GHG emissions, energy efficiency, environmental procedures, operations and recyclability of vessels. Private standards to mitigate GHG emissions in shipping emerged as a result of 'regulatory inertia' in the industry and the exclusion of international shipping from the Paris Agreement (Scott et al., 2017). There is a move towards greater regulation in the future. In June 2021, International Maritime Organisation's (IMO) Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 76 approved technical and operational measures to reduce the carbon intensity of shipping. Effective from 2023, a new regulation will require ships to calculate their Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI). A rating scheme will also indicate the reduction in carbon intensity from the 2019 reference year of ships above 5000 gross tonnage with incentives for ships to improve performance. Separate guidelines on the calculation of the Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII) are expected to be available in 2022.
To date, neither market forces alone nor the regulatory procedures adopted by the IMO are expected to be sufficient to ensure that the shipping sector decarbonises to meet the Paris Agreement goals. Furthermore, voluntary labelling schemes have a limited impact when compared with regulatory measures. The success of these private initiatives depends on their ability to persuade stakeholders (ship owners, charterers, ports, etc.) to implement the standards, provide incentives for high performers, and use the information in decision making (Scott et al., 2017). The numerous private voluntary schemes available mean that shipping companies can participate in multiple schemes. There is no simple way to compare and identify those with better environmental performance (Hermann et al., 2015; Panagakos et al., 2019).
There are several market failures in the shipping industry that limit the uptake of energy-efficient technologies. Split incentives refer to the fact that those making investments in clean technologies - ship owners - are often not the ones gaining the benefits (fuel savings or lower port fees) of the upgrades - the charterers. There is also asymmetry in the information available to different parties due to inconsistent data collection and reporting requirements that make decision making difficult (Lonsdale et al., 2019). Any assessment of emissions relies on the accuracy and availability of data. For the impact of environmental labelling to be significant, the issue of split incentives needs to be addressed (see Costs section), accurate data must be readily available, and the calculations of various environmental indicators should be streamlined and robust enough to accurately describe the environmental performance of ships and shipping companies.
Emissions reporting: Increasing availability and accuracy of data
While rating schemes are not currently regulated, there are initiatives from the European Union (EU) and IMO in place that aim to improve maritime emissions reporting. However, these regulations are not effective at reducing emissions on their own. The Monitoring Reporting and Verification (MRV) Regulation, introduced by the EU in 2015, aims to provide accurate CO2 emission information for large ships (exceeding 5000 gross tonnage) using EU ports. By making the information public, it hopes to incentivise energy efficiency improvements. The IMO Data Collection Scheme (DCS) was introduced in 2018 and also applies to ships above 5000 gross tonnage. However, it does not make the results publically available. It also uses a different indicator for energy efficiency (calculated using deadweight) than the MRV Regulation (calculated using mass of cargo carried) which underestimates emissions (Panagakos et al., 2019). The IMO DCS is expected to have a lesser impact due to the limited transparency and monitoring procedures. While the MRV Regulation addresses some market failures like availability of information, it alone is not expected to reduce emissions or incentivise efficiency improvements as split incentives still exist. The type of reporting required does not offer adequate information on the fuel consumption patterns for charterers to act on (Panagakos et al., 2019; Lonsdale et al., 2019).
Despite shortcomings and limited evidence of decision making based on these reporting initiatives alone, the move towards greater accuracy and availability of GHG emissions and energy efficiency data is an important one (Lonsdale et al., 2019). The MRV data, for example, comes from an emissions monitoring plan, which must be approved by an accredited verifier. The indicators are checked for conformity and there is a risk of sanctions and expulsion for non-compliance. Access to such data can facilitate rating schemes that evaluate performance and allow the setting of industry targets. Transparency through public access and active monitoring, as required by the MRV Regulation, could provide the information necessary for carbon constraints to be set. For example, reducing EU shipping emissions by 40% (and, if feasible, 50%) by 2050 compared to 2005 levels is a stated goal of the MRV Regulation (Panagakos et al., 2019).
Robustness of environmental labelling schemes and data
For environmental labelling to be most useful, it must consider all constituent factors of maritime emissions and allow global comparisons between shipping companies. Data must be available for all freight activity around the globe and cover ship design and operations. Though publically available, the MRV data is not globally representative. Conditions and requirements are different in other parts of the globe, and the geographic restrictions of the EU regulation introduce significant bias in the published data. If applied outside of the EU, a study comparing the MRV estimates with actual data for the same ships finds that they underestimate non-EU emissions by 38.4% (Panagakos et al., 2019). Although effective at ship-level, the IMO's mandatory Energy Efficiency Design Index is solely concerned with design efficiency rather than operational efficiency and is only applicable to ships built after 2013, which means that merely an estimated 15% of the shipping fleet would have been subject to the regulation by 2020 (Scott et al., 2017). The IMO EEXI regulation, adopted June 2021 and effective from 2023, applies to a greater portion of the international fleet: all ships above 400 gross tonnage.
None of the existing carbon intensity indicators alone are sufficient to adequately support an environmental labelling scheme used for benchmarking the environmental performance of a ship or company. Even the demand-based Energy Efficiency Operational Indicator (EEOI) stipulated by the MRV Regulation and defined as emissions per unit transport work has its shortcomings. Critics of the single indicator point out that there are several influencing factors on emissions, such as load, sea and weather conditions that lie outside the direct control of a ship owner. A grid of fuel consumption-speed curves for different sea conditions (drafts, wind, etc.) would be needed to understand the energy required for a ship in a range of environments and cannot be substituted by an average indicator. A representative test cycle could be developed to compare the technical efficiency of a certain category of vessels under standard conditions using real-world test data and computational modelling (Panagakos et al., 2019). This would help address industry concerns that some ratings may be too high level and misleading if overly simplified (Lonsdale et al., 2019).
Very little evidence is available in the public domain on CO2 emissions impacts as a result of private environmental labelling and rating schemes. Furthermore, depending on the scheme, GHG emissions make up only a portion of the scoring criteria. Some reported examples from existing schemes:
- RightShip's Existing Vessel Design Index (EVDI) uses a ship's design to estimate its CO2 emissions per nautical mile. A ship's EVDI is evaluated by comparing it with the average EVDI of ships of similar type and size. The rating scheme assigns a label from A through G. More than two dozen companies use this scheme to avoid using the least efficient ships (F or G rating). The use of this rating has reportedly shifted 20% of tonnage away from poorly rated ships and resulted in emissions savings of 5-9% (Scott et al., 2017).
- DAMCO's Carbon Dashboard assists companies in calculating supply chain emissions to identify and act on potential hot spots. Reportedly a DAMCO customer achieved a 40% reduction in supply chain emissions as a result of the tool (Scott et al., 2017).
The direct costs associated with labelling schemes are the costs of administering the program. Indirectly, proper data collection, monitoring, reporting and verification will also require some investment to facilitate reliable rating schemes. The labelling schemes themselves do not reduce emissions. Still, they will do so if ship owners invest in more energy-efficient technology incentivised by the labelling scheme and the commercial advantages it may provide. The financial benefits of energy-efficient technologies (through lower fuel usage and costs) are currently undermined by fossil fuel subsidies that keep fuel costs artificially low. If fossil fuel subsidies are removed, the financial benefits of energy efficiency improvements would be more pronounced, and there would be a greater incentive to invest in them.
The costs of energy efficiency improvements typically fall on the ship owners though the benefits of lower fuel costs, lower port fees, etc., are gained by the charterers. This causes a market failure, known as a split incentive, which makes progress in energy efficiency improvements difficult. Some emerging innovative private initiatives are seeking to remove this barrier. For example, Efficient Ship Finance (ESF) is a US company that makes the upfront investment required instead of the ship owner and then recovers the cost by claiming a share of the revenues generated as a result. Additional revenues are expected as a result of the lower fuel costs, greater resale value of efficient vessels and greater fleet utilisation. However, uptake of ESF is limited by the high cost of finance provided and the low costs of fuel (Scott et al., 2017).
There are several benefits from a business perspective that could incentivise participation in labelling schemes and encourage uptake of the energy efficiency improvements required to achieve high ratings.
- High performing shipping companies can be featured in databases of companies with good environmental performance generating more business-to-business relationships from those who also have access to these databases (Hermann et al., 2015).
- Banks in the shipping industry may use rating schemes to assess risk and return on investment, where inefficient vessels are considered a higher risk investment (Scott et al., 2017). Banks may also be interested in the information to evaluate the CO2 intensity of their portfolios and investment decisions (Lonsdale et al., 2019).
- Ports have a responsibility to maintain environmental standards. When paired with labelling schemes, ports can offer reduced fees based on performance under the scheme (Hermann et al., 2015). For example, the Environmental Ship Index (ESI) is part of the World Ports Climate Initiative. Forty ports around the world offer economic incentives based on the ESI. For example, Port of Oslo offers a 40% rebate on port fees for ships that achieve at least a 50 (out of 100) ESI score (Scott et al., 2017; Hermann et al., 2015)).
- Maritime service firms can also participate in the scheme and incentivise better environmental performance through reduced service prices (Hermann et al., 2015)
- Having rigorous estimates of a shipping company's fuel efficiency could help them benchmark and change their own operations, even if reducing fuel costs primarily serves their own interest.
- Once the IMO CII regulation is effective, compliance (continued improvement of carbon efficiency) will be beneficial. Poor performance under the regulation will require the development and approval of a corrective action plan.
If these incentives are sufficiently strong, then participation in such schemes could increase uptake of energy-efficient technologies, encourage changes in operational procedures, increase competition between ship owners, and lead to more performance-based decisions by charterers (Lonsdale et al., 2019).
Criticisms of the efficacy of labelling schemes include:
- Labels and rating schemes emphasise energy efficiency and reducing the GHG intensity of shipping but do not address cumulative emissions from the sector, which is what ultimately needs to change. A cumulative emissions target for the sector by the IMO would ensure that the actions of all stakeholders have an impact on all the others. The increased pressure and interdependence between players may lead to more effective environmental labelling schemes and more stringent compliance measures in the industry (Scott et al., 2017).
- Some critics of such schemes fear the information is too high level and could be misleading Lonsdale et al., 2019). To be a trusted source of information, these schemes need high-quality data, strict verification/accountability procedures, and must consider multiple indicators to avoid oversimplifying information.
- Since the current bodies responsible for the existing environmental labelling/rating schemes are private, there are some criticisms of the systems (Scott et al., 2017). The IMO rating scheme expected to be launched in 2023 may help address some of these points.
- Lack of transparency and accountability as the organisations can be closed and dominated by industry players.
- Accountability mechanisms can be ad-hoc rather than an integrated part of operations.
- The reliability of data sources used in evaluation can be a concern.
- Improvements in energy efficiency can have rebound effects, where more efficient shipping makes it cheaper and therefore increases consumption reducing the overall energy savings that might have been realised (Sorrell, 2007; Lonsdale et al., 2019; Scott et al., 2017). Studies have shown that technical efficiency improvements that reduce fuel consumption at a given speed have led to increased operating speeds resulting in lower operational efficiency gains than what was possible (Wilson et al., 2019).
- Few schemes currently address the split incentive problem. The market currently does not sufficiently reward investments in energy efficiency, limiting the incentive to adopt efficient technology (Lonsdale et al., 2019). One study found that of the financial savings from their energy efficiency improvements, ship owners receive only 40%. These savings have decreased over time (Agnolucci, Smith, & Rehmatulla, 2014).
- IMO regulations currently manage the ship energy performance (tank-to-wake). New incentives will be required to increase the use of alternative fuels that reduce well-to-tank emissions compared to traditional fossil fuels. Many countries and transport sectors have already implemented similar instruments based on the life-cycle assessment of a representative combination of fuels and pathway technologies. A Low Carbon Fuel Standard would send the right price signal for investment in alternative low-carbon fuels.
ITF (2021), Transport Climate Action Directory - Environmental labelling of vessels and emission reporting
https://www.itf-oecd.org/policy/environmental-labelling-vessels-emission...
Agnolucci, P., Smith, T. & Rehmatulla, N. (2014) Energy efficiency and time charter rates: Energy efficiency savings recovered by ship owners in the Panamax market, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2014.05.004
IMO (2021), Further shipping GHG emission reduction measures adopted, https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/MEPC76.aspx
Hermann, R. R et al. (2015) Eco-labelling for the promotion of wind assisted propulsion in cargo ships, https://vbn.aau.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/223342606/Eco_labelling_report_FINAL_300615_ny.pdf
Lonsdale, J. et al. (2019) A study to estimate the benefits of removing market barriers in the shipping sector, https://op.europa.eu/en-GB/publication-detail/-/publication/97c53cc7-5042-11e9-a8ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
Panagakos, G. et al. (2019) Monitoring the Carbon Footprint of Dry Bulk Shipping in the EU: An Early Assessment of the MRV Regulation, https://doi.org/10.3390/su11185133
Scott, J. et al. (2017) The Promise and Limits of Private Standards in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping, https://doi.org/10.1093/jel/eqw033
Sorrell, S. (2007) The Rebound Effect: an assessment of the evidence for economy-wide energy savings from improved energy efficiency, https://d2e1qxpsswcpgz.cloudfront.net/uploads/2020/03/the-rebound-effect-an-assessment-of-the-evidence-for-economy-wide-energy-savings-from-improved-energy-efficiency.pdf
Wilson, C. et al. (2019) Reducing the maritime sector's contribution to climate change and air pollution - The Potential Role of Targets and Economic Instruments, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/816020/potential-role-targets-economic-instruments.pdf